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Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 (Jan. 26, 2012) 1
FAMILY LAW – CHILD SUPPORT
Summary
The Court addressed an appeal 2 from a district court post-divorce decree order setting
fixed monthly child support payments and assessing arrearage and penalties.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court found the district court order to be an impermissible modification and
remanded for further proceedings, consistent with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(“UIFSA”). Under UIFSA, a Nevada court retains subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a
Nevada child support order even when the parties and children do not reside in Nevada, provided
no other state has assumed jurisdiction. However, without consent, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to modify such an order when the parties and children do not reside in Nevada. A
court may clarify an order, but if it changes the parties’ rights, it is a modification.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1998, a Nevada district court granted Robert Scotlund Vaile (“Vaile”) and Cisilie A.
Porsboll (“Porsboll”) a divorce. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ agreement on child
support payments. Under the agreement, Vaile was required to pay Porsboll monthly child
support payments of an amount to be calculated using the parties’ annual exchange of income
statements or tax return information. The parties never exchanged such financial data or used the
method for calculating payments. Nonetheless, Vaile paid Porsboll $1,300 a month in child
support from August 1998 to April 2000, when he stopped voluntarily making payments.
In November 2007, Porsboll filed a motion in Nevada district court asking it to establish
a “sum certain” 3 amount of child support due from Vaile each month, to calculate Vaile’s child
support arrears, and to issue a judgment for those arrearages. At the time of the filing, neither
the parties nor their children resided in Nevada.
The district court granted Porsboll’s motion and set Vaile’s monthly child support
payment at $1,300, the amount he previously paid voluntarily. Using that amount, the district
court calculated Vaile’s arrears and assessed him penalties. It then ordered a judgment against
him. Vaile appealed and, inter alia, challenged the court’s child support and penalty
determinations, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the
child support agreement in the divorce decree.
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By Thomas L. Chittum, III.
The Court considered the consolidated appeals of both parties but resolved the matter without reaching Porsboll’s
challenge to the district court’s methodology for calculating penalties.
3
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.070(1)(B) (2007).
2

Discussion
Justice Hardesty wrote for the Court, which reversed the district court’s order setting
Vaile’s support payment at $1,300, reversed the calculation of arrearages and penalties, and
remanded for further proceedings. Justices Saitta and Parraguirre concurred.
The UIFSA, which has been enacted in all 50 states, creates a “single-order system” for
child support orders, so that only one state’s order is effective at any given time. 4 Because no
other state had entered a child support order superseding the one incorporated into Vaile and
Porsboll’s divorce decree, the Nevada order was still the “controlling order.” 5
Under UIFSA, an issuing court retains “continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify”
its order if, at the time of request for modification, its order is controlling and the parties reside in
the issuing state. 6 However, the issuing state lacks authority to modify a support order when the
parties and children do not reside there, even if the order is controlling and has not been modified
by another state. 7 Here, neither the parties nor children resided in Nevada at the time Porsboll
filed her motion. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the order. 8
Nonetheless, the issuing court still had jurisdiction to enforce its order and could clarify
its order for purpose of enforcement. 9 The Court therefore had to determine whether the district
court order setting Vaile’s obligation at $1,300 a month was a clarification or modification.
The Court had not previously examined the distinction between modification and
clarification of a district court order in family law context, so it turned to other courts that had.
Those courts looked to whether the contested order changed the parties’ substantive rights under
a previous order or merely defined those rights. 10 The Court concluded that a modification
occurs when an order alters the parties’ substantive rights, but a clarification involves the court
defining the rights that have already been awarded.
Since the monthly support payment awarded in the divorce decree was to be recalculated
annually using tax return information or income statements, it was possible the amount would
change from year to year. By setting Vaile’s payment at the fixed amount of $1,300 a month, the
district court “substantively altered the parties’ rights” and therefore impermissibly modified,
rather than clarified, the child support order.
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Nevada’s version of UIFSA was codified at NEV. REV. STAT. CH. 130.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 130.207 (2007).
6
Id. at § 130.205(1)(A) (2007).
7
Id.
8
The Court noted that parties may consent to a court’s jurisdiction to modify a child support order. See NEV. REV.
STAT. § 130.205(1)(B). Here, however, there was no evidence of either party’s consent.
9
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 130.206 (2007); Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 510-11 (R.I. 2011); Nordstrom v.
Nordstrom, 649 S.E. 2d 200, 204 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
10
See Collins v. Billow, 592 S.E.2d 843, 844-45 (Ga. 2004); Boucher v. Boucher, 191 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1971); Ulrich v. Ulrich, 400 N.W. 2d 213, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Stoelting v. Stoelting, 412 N.W.2d 861,
862-63 (N.D. 1987); In Re Marriage of Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259, 1261-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
5

Conclusion
Under UIFSA, a Nevada court may enforce or clarify a Nevada child support order even
when the parties and children do not reside in Nevada, if no other state has assumed jurisdiction.
However, a Nevada court may not modify a child support order when neither the parties nor
children reside in Nevada, unless the parties consent. It is clarification when the court defines
the parties’previously awarded substantive rights, but modification when it alters those rights.

